


































































































































































































 I) Introduction 
 
  This paper builds on insights of trade theory to analyze questions in finance. We are 
not the first ones to take this road. Helpman and Razin (1978) introduced a stock market 
economy à-la-Diamond into a framework that fits the standard Ricardian and Hecksher-Ohlin 
models of international trade. More recent contributions have extended this line of work, 
including Svensson (1988), Persson and Svensson (1989). Some of the issues raised by these 
authors are similar to ours, but the approach they adopt is very different: contrary to our 
paper, this literature takes the number of securities traded as exogenous and bases the analysis 
of asset trade on autarky prices
1. More importantly, our analysis goes beyond the Ricardian 
interpretation of trade in assets and applies some of the insights of static models of intra-
industry trade (Krugman, 1979, Dixit and Norman 1980 and Helpman and Krugman, 1985) to 
financial flows. Those models have the following basic structure: two countries, one 
homogenous freely traded good (the numéraire), and a variety of differentiated goods 
produced under monopolistic competition. This type of model has in particular been proposed 
to explain intra-industry trade as well as empirically observed relationships between the size 
of economies and the volume of trade between them.  
To turn this model into a model of asset trade and make sense of several empirical 
findings of the finance literature, let the numéraire good be consumption today and the 
differentiated commodities be claims on consumption in different states of nature tomorrow. 
Those assets are imperfect substitutes because the investment projects on which they are 
based have linearly independent payoffs. Then standard assumptions of expected utility with 
CRRA preferences map to some extent into "love for diversity" Dixit-Stiglitz style 
preferences and monopolistic competition on financial markets.  Intuitively, the "home 
                                                           
1 For  more recent studies of international trade in assets in an incomplete market setting, see Cole (1993) and  
Davis, Nalewaik and Willen (2001).  
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market" effects which translate into size effects in the trade literature also appear in the 
finance version we present here. There are interesting differences, however, as well as 
additional effects coming from the intertemporal nature of the questions we discuss.   
The theoretical framework we propose to analyze international financial markets has 
the following four key characteristics: i) agents are risk-averse, ii) assets are imperfect 
substitutes and financial markets are imperfectly competitive, iii) the number of financial 
assets is endogenous, iv) cross-border asset trade entails some transaction costs.  
In our model, the extent of financial market incompleteness is endogenous. The 
decision by one agent to develop a new risky investment and to put a new security on the 
market enhances risk-sharing opportunities for all agents in the world. Because of co-
ordination failures, the extent of market incompleteness is inefficiently high in equilibrium. 
This approach is related to the financial and macro-economic literature on incomplete asset 
markets and risk-sharing as well as to the literature on trade under uncertainty. Allen and Gale 
(1994) provide an excellent account of the literature on financial innovation and risk sharing
2. 
But in their work, the number of risky investment projects is exogenously given (unlike in our 
model). They introduce issuing costs for securities but have no transaction costs, nor do they 
analyze international asset trade. More closely related to this paper is Pagano (1993). He 
looks at the decision to float of companies on the stock market and introduces trading 
externalities. But his model is a pure exchange closed economy; we endogenize the 
investment decisions of entrepreneurs and analyze international capital flows. Obstfeld (1994) 
studies the links between international trade in assets and growth.   
Our work is close to Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997), which studies the impact of risk 
diversification on growth. There are two major differences: in our model transaction costs 
                                                           
2 See also Magill and Quinzii (1996) who survey the general equilibrium theory of incomplete markets and 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996). A recent model of endogenously incomplete asset markets is Bisin (1998). The 
origin of market incompleteness in this paper is quite different from that in our work.  In our model,  
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play a major role as well as monopolistic competition on financial markets. Furthermore, they 
focus on capital accumulation and growth. We study the interactions between size, 
incompleteness of markets, and price of financial assets in open economies. Finally our work 
is related to Matsuyama (2001) which emphasizes the role of domestic credit market 
imperfection to generate inequality across countries when financial globalization occurs.  
In section II, we review in detail some empirical results that motivate our theoretical 
approach. We argue in particular that several empirical findings show the importance of 
demand and size effects on financial markets, a point which is not well explained in classic 
finance models and which comes out naturally in our model.  
  The general framework is presented in Section III. Section IV illustrates the effect of 
country size on financial markets in a model without intertemporal smoothing effects. This 
simplified model conveys clear intuitions about the results. It also allows us to draw 
interesting comparisons with the models of intra-industry trade.  Section V shows that in a 
more general model, the relevant measure of the size effect is aggregate income. In that part, 
we can also study richer intertemporal questions. Section VI analyses some implications of 
our general model for financial integration, portfolio diversification, home bias in equities and 
financial trade flows. Section VII discusses welfare implications. The impact of domestic 






II. Empirical motivation 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
endogeneous incompleteness comes from the fixed cost in the development of investment projects. In this paper  
4
Our framework is consistent with several empirical findings regarding demand and 
market size effects on equity prices and  the pattern of international equity flows.  
A number of empirical papers in finance uncover downward sloping demand curves 
for equities, a fact that is consistent with imperfect substituability of equities. This contrasts 
with textbook finance models
3 that produce flat demand curves.  Indeed, as long as equities 
are modeled as claims to residual cash flows with many perfect substitutes, the price elasticity 
of demand for equities should be infinite. These empirical papers  disentangle pure demand 
effects from information effects on the price of stocks by studying specific events such as the 
inclusion of stocks in specific indexes or changes in their weighting. Shleifer (1986) argues 
that the inclusion of stocks in the S&P 500 index leads to a rise in demand for those stocks, 
since they automatically fall into the shopping basket of many mutual funds.  He finds a 
permanent price increase of 2.79% for those stocks, which implies a demand elasticity of 
roughly -1. Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (August 2000) show that stocks without close 
substitutes experience differentially higher price jumps upon inclusion in the S&P 500. They 
find a relatively flat demand curve for stocks which have close substitutes (elasticity of -11.2) 
but a much steeper slope for stocks with no close substitutes (elasticity of -5.32).  
In these papers, the price increase is  prima facie evidence of a downward-sloping 
demand curve for stocks
4. Furthermore, Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (August 2000) show 
convincingly that the degree of substitutability across stocks is not as high as commonly 
thought, so that supply and demand shocks have significant price effects. Stocks are much 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
it comes from costly financial intermediation.  
3 See Scholes (1972). 
4 Further evidence is provided by Kaul, Mehrotra and Morck (April 2000) who look at weighting adjustments of 
stocks constituting the TSE 300 index (Toronto Stock Exchange ). These weighting adjustments are announced 
in advance to market participants, and they do not contain any information about the performance of the 
companies; they are purely arbitrary phenomena. The authors show that 31 stocks which saw an increase in their 
weights and therefore a positive demand shock experienced statistically significant event-week excess returns of 
2.34%. The point estimate of the cumulative excess return 15 weeks after the event was virtually identical to its 




more like "unique works of art" than Scholes (1972) recognized.  Although less has been 
written on the supply curves for equities, the existing empirical evidence (see Bagwell, 1992) 
suggests that they are upward-sloping. 
Our theoretical framework generates very naturally downward-sloping demand curves 
and upward-sloping supply curves due to imperfect substituability and risk aversion. A logical 
consequence is therefore that assets with larger demand have a higher price.  In an 
international framework with segmented markets, this translates into size effects: larger 
economies exhibit higher asset prices. Evidence is provided by studies that analyze the price 
difference when the same asset is issued on the stock market of a small  economy and on the 
market of a large economy (typically the New York Stock Exchange). For example, 
Alexander, Cheol and Janakiraman (1988) find that non US firms which get listed on the 
NYSE attain a  significantly higher share price
5. 
In our model, financial integration between two markets (lower transaction costs) can 
be interpreted as an increase in effective market size: it generates an increase in total demand 
for assets and induces higher asset prices. This finding is supported by Stulz (1999), Bekaert 
and Harvey (1998), Hardouvelis et al. (1999) and Henry (2000) for various experiences of 
market liberalization. The last paper finds that when foreigners are allowed to purchase 
shares, a country's aggregate equity price index increases significantly.  
A voluminous literature (surveyed in Lewis 1999) has emphazised that investors hold 
what seems to be a disproportionate amount of domestic assets. An international CAPM   
predicts that agents should hold equities in proportion to market capitalizations provided that 
there are no barriers to international equity investment. Ahearne et al. (2000) report that the 
home bias of US equity holders has decreased since the mid-1980s but remains at a high 
level. In 1997, foreign equities represented around 10% of US equity holdings (2% in the late 
                                                           
5 There is an abundant literature which supports this finding. Recent examples are Bekaert and Harvey (1997),  
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1980s). In 1997, the market capitalization of the US amounted to 48% of the world market 
capitalization. In our model, a "home bias" for equities arises for two reasons: the existence of 
transaction costs in asset trade that interact with the degree of risk aversion; and imperfect 
competition on asset markets that induces firms owners to retain a disproportionate amount of 
their equity.  
The model also demonstrates the importance of size of economies and transaction 
costs for trade flows in assets. This is consistent with recent empirical evidence on bilateral 
gross cross-border equity flows in Portes and Rey (1999). They show that such flows depend 
positively on various measures of country size (GDP, market capitalization or financial 
wealth) and sophistication of the market and negatively on transaction costs and informational 
frictions (proxied by distance or the phone call traffic). These variables explain as much as 
83% of the cross-sectional variation of the data. These “gravity” equations for financial trade 
flows are therefore comparable in terms of explanatory power to the "gravity" equations for 
trade flows, which are one of the strongest empirical regularities in international economics. 
In section VI, we use the Portes-Rey data set to estimate the specific equation of bilateral 
equity flows that come from our theoretical model. The findings are consistent with our 
theoretical implications. 
Finally, at a more qualitative level, the US is sometimes described as a “super-market” 
for financial assets. American markets offer a wide range of financial assets and are both very 
broad and liquid. In our framework, the menu of financial assets available is wider in 
equilibrium in the large and rich economy. 
 
 
III. The general framework 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Foerster and Karolyi (1998) and Miller (1999).  
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  We consider a two-period model with two countries or financial areas, A and B. They 
are respectively populated with nA and nB risk-averse immobile identical agents.  In the first 
period agents are respectively endowed with yA and yB units of a freely traded good (the 
numéraire), which they can choose to consume, invest in fixed-size risky projects or use to 
buy shares on the stock market. In the second period, there are N exogenously determined and 
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Shares of these projects (claims on the risky dividends) are traded on the stock markets of the 
two countries. This implies that investing in a specific project (either directly or through the 
stock market) is equivalent (in terms of pay-off) to buying an Arrow-Debreu asset that pays in 
only one state of nature. As in Acemoglu and Zillibotti (1997), this formalization captures the 
first main feature of our model: different projects and assets are imperfectly correlated, so that 
assets are imperfect substitutes.  
The fixed-size investment projects are costly to develop. An agent hA ∈ {1,…nA} 
chooses to develop zhA different projects (zhB for an agent hB ∈ {1,…nB} in country B). In 
equilibrium, because all projects have the same expected return and because we assume that 
the set of projects is common knowledge, agents have no interest in duplicating a project that 
has already been developed. Also, because agents of the same country are identical ex-ante 
they choose to develop the same number of projects. M, the total number of projects (and 














. The set of projects that have been developed in 
country A and country B are MA and MB respectively. The equilibrium total number of assets 
in the world M = MA + MB is endogenous. We restrict parameters so that M < N: markets in  
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general are not complete, meaning that it is not possible to eliminate all risk by holding a 
portfolio of all traded assets. In some states of the world in the second period, there is no 
production, so that consumption is zero. Hence, in general, the matrix of the pay-offs of 
projects has the following form: 
Matrix of payoffs:  
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0       0 0       0       0       0
0       0 d       0       0       0
0       0 0       d       0       0
0       0 0       0       d       0
0       0 0       0       0       d
......





   
The cost of each new project is increasing with the number of projects an agent is performing: 
we assume that the monitoring of each project becomes more complex and costly as the 
number of projects increases. The total cost in units of the numéraire of the investment in 
risky projects of an agent hA is f(zhA), with f'(z) > 0 and f”(z) > 0. The investment cost function 
in country B is similar. There is no restriction on the development of new projects. This 
determines the equilibrium number of projects and therefore the equilibrium number of assets. 
One way to interpret the model is that the risky projects that agents develop are combined to 
create firms, so that each agent creates a firm with possibly a different number of projects.  
Transaction costs 
In the first period, agents raise capital by selling shares of their projects and they buy 
shares of other projects. The second essential feature of the model is the presence of 
international transaction costs on asset markets.  When agents trade assets internationally, 
they incur a transaction cost τ, which is paid in units of the share itself.  The same transaction 
cost also applies to the stochastic dividend and is paid in units of the dividend. For our set up  
9
to make sense, we need to assume that these transaction costs cannot be evaded by going 
through the goods market on which, for convenience, we assume no transaction costs.  
The transaction cost is modeled as an iceberg cost: part of the share and part of the 
dividend “melt” during the transit. As in the trade literature, from which it is borrowed, the 
iceberg form greatly simplifies the results because it eliminates the need to introduce financial 
intermediaries as an additional sector. It also implies that the elasticity of demand for an asset 
with respect to its price is the same whether the transaction cost is paid or not, that is, whether 
the asset is a domestic or a foreign one. 
The presence of international transaction costs on assets captures different types of 
costs: 1) banking commissions and variable fees
6; 2) exchange-rate transaction costs; 3) some 
information costs. Gordon and Bovenberg (1996) use the same type of proportional 
transaction costs on capital flows and focus on the asymmetry of information between foreign 
and domestic investors to justify them. 
There are two ways to introduce these transaction costs on the international trade in 
assets. The first is to make buyers of the assets bear the transaction cost. In this case, the 
amount paid by an agent hB located in country B to buy an asset sold on the stock market in 




h h s p , where 
A h p  is the price of a share of a project 




h s is the demand of agent hB for an asset sold by agent hA. If an 
asset pays a dividend d in period 2, then a shareholder in country B receives only (1-τ)d per 
share. Profits generated by projects in country A are denominated in the currency of country 
A, so that agents in country B have to incur the transaction cost at that stage too.  
                                                           
6 Danthine et al. (2000) estimate for example that cross-border financial transactions in Europe cost ten to 
twenty times more than domestic ones. This comes from the fact that cross-border payments and securities 
settlements are substantially more expensive, time-consuming and complicated than domestic ones. Custody risk 
is also increased by the number of intermediaries and juridictions involved.  
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  The second possible way to introduce transaction costs is to have project owners bear 
the transaction cost. These two ways of introducing transaction costs produce the same results 
as long as we assume that international transaction costs paid by agents buying shares and by 
project owners selling shares are identical.  
 
Budget constraint 
We choose to present the version of the model where buyers pay the transaction costs as they 
anyway bear the cost. In this configuration, the budget constraint for an agent hA in country A 
is: 






















h i h h p y s p s p z f c α τ) 1 ( ) ( 1     (1A) 
where c1hA is consumption of agent hA in period 1. The second term on the left-hand side is 
the cost of investment in risky projects. The two last terms on the left-hand side represent the 
demands for domestic and foreign assets. There are (MA- zhA) different domestic assets that 
agent hA demands as he only buys assets of projects he has not developed himself. There are 
MB different foreign assets on which he has to incur the transaction cost τ. On the revenue 
side, in addition to endowment y, agent hA sells a portion 
k
hA α of each project k∈ zhA that he 
has developed.  ) 1 (
k
hA α − is the portion of the project that agent hA keeps and does not float on 
the market. Hence, we also interpret 
k
hA α as a measure of the extent of diversification chosen 
by agent hA. The reason is that if 
k
hA α is low, it means that the agent keeps a large portion of 
the risky investment projects he has developed. In this case, he does not diversify much the 
risk attached to those projects. The budget constraint of an agent hB in country B is 
symmetric: 
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IV. An illustrative version of the model without intertemporal smoothing effects 
We first illustrate the size effects in a model where intertemporal smoothing effects 
are eliminated because it simplifies the analysis and it allows us to draw parallels easily with 
the international trade in goods literature. We study the more general version of the model in 
section V. Since smoothing effects are absent in this example, we assume that the per capita 
endowments received in first period are identical for all agents in the world. This implies that 
difference in country size is solely driven by differences in population size. This follows the 
tradition of the "home market" effect in  trade theory with increasing returns (see Krugman, 
1980, and Helpman and Krugman, 1985, p 205-209 for example). In order to eliminate the 
intertemporal smoothing effects, we adopt a linear utility in the first period so that the utility 
























E c EU           (2) 
where β is the rate of discount of the future and σ  is the inverse of the degree of risk 
aversion. The utility of agents in country B is similar. The state of the world is revealed at the 
beginning of the second period, so that given the description of the payoffs of the different 
projects, and our assumption that all states of nature have the same probability 1/N, the 








































































































        
/ 1 1
)] 1 ( [ 1
/ 1 1
1
                      (3) 
The second element in equation (3) is the expected consumption in states i backed by assets 
of risky projects developed by agents in country A other than those developed by agent hA 
himself. The third element is the expected consumption in states j backed by assets of risky 
projects developed by agents in country B. The last element is the expected consumption in  
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states which are backed by assets of risky projects developed by the agent hA himself. The 
measure of the extent to which he has decided not to diversify his own risk is therefore 
k
hA α − 1 for each project/asset k∈ {1,…,zhA}. The expected utility of an agent in country B is 
symmetric.  This simplified model allows us to draw interesting parallels with the trade 
literature. Equation (3) looks similar to a Dixit-Stiglitz "love for diversity" type of utility 
function. Here, however, the "love for diversity" comes entirely from risk aversion and the 
strong structure we impose on the matrix of payoffs. Note also that because of the 
intertemporal nature of our set-up, the usual Cobb-Douglas structure of preferences, used 
extensively in the international trade in goods literature, would not be appropriate here. By 
contrast to the trade in goods model, the share of total income that goes into first-period 
consumption (the homogenous good in the trade version) and the share of income that goes 




  The fixed cost that is required to develop a new project insures that no agent will ever 
find it optimal to replicate an already existing project. If he were to do so, the supply of the 
corresponding asset would necessarily increase so that its equilibrium price would decrease
7. 
It is therefore always more profitable to develop a project that has not been opened yet. Each 
agent has  an ex post monopoly power on the projects that he has developed and therefore on 
the sale of the assets that correspond to these projects.  This is a departure from the Arrow-
Debreu world where asset markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive. It is easy to check 
that the perceived elasticity of demand for any asset k with respect to its price is:  
                                                           






k) = -σ, k∈M.  The owner of the asset exploits this imperfectly competitive 
structure and sells only a portion of his project. The fact that firms extensively buy and sell 
their own stocks to affect the price of their shares is consistent with this feature of our setup. 
We show below, however, that the monopolistic competition structure on asset markets is not 
essential for most of our results. This structure of the market also implies that σ, the price 
elasticity, is necessarily more than one.  Otherwise the model would be degenerate, as asset 
suppliers would always be better off selling less of the asset at a higher price. Also, for the 
monopolistic competition structure to make sense the parameters must be such that the 
number of projects each agent develops is small relative to the total number of projects.  
Otherwise, agents would take into account the effect of their pricing policy on the aggregate 
outcome. This is similar to the structure of trade models with differentiated products. 
  Because all agents in the same country are ex ante identical and projects are 
symmetric, the demands for assets of a given country by agents of the same nationality is 
symmetric. Even though agents, in equilibrium, are not identical because they hold different 
amounts of the different assets, they are symmetric in the sense that their diversification 
choice is identical. Also, the prices of all projects/assets developed by agents of the same 
country are identical for the same reason. Hence, from now on, we omit notations that refer to 
the identity of the agents and of the assets. Agents (and their projects/assets) are identified 
only by their nationality A or B. The superscript denotes the origin of the asset and the 
subscript denotes the nationality of the buyer. Hence, for example, 
B
A s  is the demand for an 
asset of country B by an agent of country A. 
  
14
Asset demands and supplies  
Agents in country A maximize expected utility given by (3) under the budget constraint (1A). 
Agent hA in country A chooses consumption
8 in period 1, c1hA, the number of projects zhA he 
develops, the demands for the different assets (domestic and foreign) and the portion of each 
of his projects that he retains in the second period: 
k
hA α − 1  for each project/asset k∈ {1,…, 
zhA}. When buying shares on the stock market, agents are price-takers. When selling shares, 
agents use their ex post monopoly power. 














The first order conditions give the individual supplies and demands for shares as a 
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     (4) 
The first line of equation (4) indicates that the supply of each asset on the market is an 
increasing function of the price and a decreasing function of the dividend d. The demands for 
assets are decreasing in the price and increasing in the dividend. The demands for foreign 
assets are in addition decreasing in the transaction costs. Note that the supply of assets 
depends negatively on δ. It is easy to check that, in the exact same setup, if agents were not to 
perceive or to exploit their monopolistic power, then the same first order conditions would 
apply except that δ would be set to 1. Hence, from now on, we interpret δ as a measure of 
imperfect competition on asset markets
9.  
                                                           
8 We only consider high enough values of y so that optimal first period consumption is strictly positive. 
9 We come back to this in more detail in section VI.  
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We use the equilibrium conditions for each stock market and for each asset. The 
amount of shares offered for a specific asset equals the aggregate domestic demand plus the 
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φ  is a useful transformation of transaction costs and is less than 1 (σ >1). 
This parameter is an indicator of market segmentation. It measures the extent to which the 
interaction between transaction costs and risk aversion leads foreign agents to restrain their 
demand for domestic assets. Lower transaction costs lead to lower market segmentation and 
higher φ.  
 
Prices and number of risky projects 
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Finally, we determine the optimal choice for zA and zB, the number of projects and therefore 
the number of assets developed by each agent in country A and B. Because the number of 
projects must be a natural number, we have to assume that N is large enough so that the 
equilibrium can be considered as an approximation: 
B B A A p (z f'       p z f = = ) ; ) ( '           (8)  
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Due to perfect competition on the market for developing projects, the choice for the 
number of projects, zA and zB, is such that the price of the asset (pA and pB respectively) is 
equal to the marginal cost of the last project. The assumed convexity of the cost function 
implies that the number of projects/assets is increasing in asset prices in both countries. Free 
entry on the market for investment projects determines the total number of projects/assets and 
therefore the extent of financial market incompleteness defined by N-(nA zA )-(nB zB). We only 
consider the more realistic and interesting case where financial markets are incomplete: not 
all states of the world are covered by an Arrow-Debreu asset. In some states of the world 
consumption is zero in the second period.  The case of incomplete markets arises for example 
for N large enough or for parameters such that the cost function f(z) is sufficiently convex. 
 
Size effects 
The size effects are very clear in this example: if country A is the larger economy (has 
a larger population), then more diversification occurs in the large country than in the small 
one: αA > αB. Project owners in the large country choose to retain fewer shares of their 
projects and to sell more on the stock market. In this sense, financial markets are more 
developed in the large country, so there exists a market size effect on financial markets.  
The second size effect is on the price for shares. These shares of projects developed by 
agents located in the large country have a higher price than those developed in the small 
country: pA > pB. This has an immediate implication for the expected returns of an asset 
defined as: d/(Npi ), i = A, B. The expected return is smaller in the large country than in the 
small one. The size effect in this example comes solely from the presence of transaction costs 
and risk aversion coupled with imperfect substitution between assets. If international 
transaction costs were zero (φ =1), then asset prices would be equal in the two countries.  
Note also that if agents were risk neutral (σ→∞), then again the price difference between the  
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two countries would vanish. In this case, the price of the asset collapses to the traditional 
expected discounted dividend.  
   As long as the cost function f is convex, the large country, which has the higher asset 
price, sustains more projects per agent: zA > zB. This implies that  the number of different 
assets per capita is higher in the large country. Large countries will exhibit a broader menu of 
financial assets (financial “super-markets”). We could also interpret this result as saying that 
firms in the large country are made of more projects.  
It is also possible to endogenize d, which can be interpreted as the size of each project 
in the model. If we assume that, subject to a convex cost function, agents can choose larger 
projects (projects with larger dividends), then it is easy to show that each agent of the large 
economy develops more projects and also projects of larger size. 
To gain intuition on these results, we come back to the first order conditions of the 
agents.  When choosing how much to sell of their own projects on the domestic stock market, 
agents set the marginal loss in utility of doing so equal to the marginal gain (the Lagrangian is 
equal to 1 because of linearity of utility in first period) so that: 
 
1
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  (9) 
These are respectively the optimality condition, for the representative agent in A and in B. The 
expected marginal disutility of selling one more share of the project is the expected welfare 
loss due to consumption thus foregone (left hand side of the equation).  Note that because of 
the concavity of the expected utility in consumption, this marginal loss in utility is naturally 
rising with the portion of the project sold. The marginal gain is less than the price of the asset 
as an increase in the supply of the asset implies a decrease in its price.  At the optimum, the 
price of a share is equal to its marginal disutility multiplied by the mark up σ/(σ-1). Note (see  
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equations  (6) and (7)) that quite intuitively, the more imperfectly competitive the asset 
markets are (the higher δ), the higher the asset prices and the lower the diversification (α).  
Using the equilibrium on asset markets, and the demands given in (4), we get the 
aggregate demand for a specific asset in both countries: 
  ) 1 (    ;    ) 1 (

































     (10) 
The market size effect is a demand side effect. If country A is larger than country B, aggregate 
saving is larger in A than in B. The existence of transaction costs (φ < 1) induces a home bias 
in the demand for assets: the total demand for an asset of the large country is larger than the 
demand for an asset in the small country for a given price.  As can also be seen from the 
equation above, demands in both countries are decreasing in the price. On graph 1, we 
illustrate the determination of the prices of assets, pA and pB, and of the extent of 
diversification, αA and αB which are also measures of the supply of assets: 
 









As pointed out in the introduction, these market size effects are reminiscent of the 
home market effect in the new trade and geography literatures (Helpman and Krugman, 
α 
MD 
 price = MD σ/(σ-1) 
demand for domestic asset in country B 
demand for domestic asset in country A 
αA  αB 
 pA 
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marginal disutility  
(MD) and prices  
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1985). As in the trade literature they come from the combination of imperfect substitution and 
transaction costs. But in our setup, in addition to effects on the supply and on the number of 
assets, country size also influences asset prices. This supplementary effect comes from the 
supply curve that is increasing in the price of the asset, a feature that is derived directly from 
risk aversion. 
  In the version of the model we have presented here, the size effect is, as in the trade 
literature, an effect that rests on population size. This is an obvious limitation of this simple 
framework. Hence, in the next section we introduce a richer intertemporal structure in order 
to show that when utility is non-linear in the first period, the relevant measure of the size 
effect is aggregate income 
 
 
V. A more general model with intertemporal substitution effects 
We now analyze in  detail the same framework with a more general utility function 





































U          (11) 
for an agent hA in country A (and symmetrically for an agent in country B). The first order 
conditions are similar to those given in equation (4) except that they also depend on 
consumption per capita in the first period.  
The equilibrium conditions on the stock markets are still given by equation (5) and 
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Because the marginal utility of consumption in the first period is not constant, there is 
intertemporal smoothing. Consumption in the first period affects the demand and supply of 
assets and therefore their equilibrium price. Note that in addition to the size effects analyzed 
above, an increase in home per capita consumption in the first period increases the price of 
home assets but decreases the equilibrium portion of projects sold on the stock market.  The 
number of assets in each country is still determined by the equilibrium condition (8) so that a 
higher price of assets induces more risky projects (“financial super-market” effect). 
 
Income, consumption and asset prices 
Consumption per capita in both countries is determined by the consumer budget 
constraint. Because of the non-linear relation between asset prices and consumption, we 
cannot give an analytical solution for consumption. We can however analyze how income per 
capita affects consumption per capita, which in turn influences asset prices. We first derive 
the impact of an increase in income per capita y on the equilibrium consumption per capita in 
the first period. Using the consumer budget constraint and differentiating it, we get: 
B
B A B A
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λ λ γ γ
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= 1       (14) 
and a symmetric expression for consumption in B. The parameters γA, λA, γB and λB are given 
in the appendix. It is possible to show that γi > λi , i = A,B. The parameter λA /(γA γB - λA λB) 
measures the financial transmission effect of a change in income of country B on consumption 
in country A. Quite intuitively, in the case of financial autarky (infinite transaction costs, i.e. φ  
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= 0), this parameter goes to zero. Because γA > λA and γB > λB, the induced effect on  foreign 
consumption of an increase in home income is always less than on home consumption. Hence, 
it is easy to see that the country with highest per capita income is also the country with 
highest consumption per capita. Combining this and equation (13), we then find that, when 
the two countries have equal population (nA = nB), the country with higher income also 
benefits from the higher asset price. From equation (12), it can also be checked that the 
country with higher income per capita has a lower α. The reason is that higher income per 
capita leads to an increase in saving which translates into both an increase in demand and a 
(larger) decrease in supply for each asset.  
Moreover, we can show that, evaluated in the symmetric equilibrium, an increase in 
population size of country A also induces an increase in price higher in country A than in 
country B, as in the linear utility case. Both income per capita and population size affect asset 
prices and therefore the number of projects and assets in each country. Hence, the relevant 
size effect here is in terms of aggregate income.  
Therefore the model predicts that if investors in the "small" country (in the sense of 
small aggregate income) could - maybe subject to some fixed cost - issue their assets on the 
stock market of the "large country", they would be able to sell their asset at a higher price 
than when they issue it at home. This is consistent with the evidence on cross-listing 
described in section II. 
 
 Demands and Supplies of assets  
To gain intuition on these results, we can again examine the demand and supply 
curves for an asset.  
The demand curves are now given by:  
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In the presence of international transaction costs, the size of aggregate consumption 
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The supply of each asset is low when income per capita (and thus consumption) is high 
because agents increase savings and therefore keep a larger share of their own investment 
projects. These demand and supply curves are shown on graph 2. 
 
 











Using equation (13), it is easy to check that the price of assets in country A is higher than in 
country B if the following inequality holds: 
() [] () [] B B A A c n c n 1 1 1 1 1 1 − + − > − + − δ φ δ φ     
Remember that the parameter δ can be interpreted as a measure of imperfect competition on 
capital markets. When those markets are perfectly competitive, δ goes to unity and investors 
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retain a lower share of their investment. In that case the differential in price depends only on 
the differential in aggregate consumption, which depends on the differential in aggregate 
income. This is the size effect in this version of the model. The effect is a demand effect; as 
can be seen in equation (15), it depends on the presence of international transaction costs (φ 
<1), that is on the existence of market segmentation.  
When asset markets are not competitive, that is when δ is more than unity, then in 
addition to the size effect (aggregate consumption and income) the level of consumption per 
capita plays a role in the determination of the asset price. This effect comes from the supply 
side. The reason is that when income and consumption per capita are larger, all agents, in 
order to save more, reduce the supply of equities of the project they have developed. This 
supply effect does not depend on the presence of transaction costs on asset markets so that 
asset prices across markets are not equal even without transaction costs if consumptions per 
capita, that is if income per capita, differ.  
 
VI. General Implications of the model 
  In this section, we analyze several characteristics of the model which are common to 
the illustrative model developed in section IV and to the fully-fledged model of section V. 
 
Financial integration and asset prices 
  One way to look at the impact of market size in our model is to analyze the effect of 
lower transaction costs on international trade in assets, which de facto implies an increase in 
market size for all assets in the world. The reason is that lowering transaction costs between A 
and B implies that agents in A (B) increase their demand for assets of country B (A). In our 
model, financial integration
10 of this type can be modeled as an increase in φ. We look at the 
                                                           
10 Martin and Rey (2000) analyse in detail the effect of financial integration on the geographical location of  
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effect of such an increase in the symmetric case where countries A and B are identical
11. In 
this case, for the general model, we get the following comparative statics for the price of 
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        (17) 
The price of assets increases as the demand for assets from foreign agents increases with 
lower transaction costs. This is consistent with the evidence cited in section II on the impact 
of financial integration on asset prices. It is also easy to check that the extent of 
diversification increases when transaction costs between  financial markets fall. 
 
Portfolio diversification and imperfect competition on asset markets 
The first order conditions, whatever the form of utility in the first period, provide the 





A s s α δ α δ − = − = 1       ; 1           (18) 
This equation implies that agents in both countries do not fully diversify their 
domestic portfolio as 1 - αA  > 
A
A s   and 1 - αB  > 
B
B s  whenever  δ>1. Because assets are all ex-
ante symmetric, full domestic diversification would imply that agents keep no more 
ownership of their own projects than they buy of projects developed by other agents in the 
same country. If agents fully diversified in country A, they would set: 1 - αA  = 
A
A s .  Ex-post 
all agents in a given country would hold the exact same portfolio. This is not the case, and 
agents in both countries keep more shares of their own project than they buy of those projects 
developed by others.  By doing so, each agent exploits the non-competitive structure of the 
asset market. This confirms our interpretation of the parameter δ as a measure of imperfect 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
financial centres in a simpler three-country model. 
11 The results with asymmetric countries are qualitatively similar.  
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competition on asset markets. The case where agents do not exploit their monopolistic power 
on asset markets can be analyzed by setting δ =1. It can be checked that although prices and 
diversification are altered, the qualitative results on the size effects remain intact in the case 
of perfect competition. The effect of per capita consumption on the supply and price of assets  
analyzed in the previous section would not appear, however. 
If we interpret firms as combinations of projects, then firms have, a “nationality”, in 
equilibrium. Due to imperfect competition, there is one agent with a specific nationality who 
chooses optimally to keep a higher share of the project he has himself developed. 
 
Home bias 
  We derive the value of domestic assets
12 of a representative agent as a percentage of 
the value of his whole portfolio (inclusive of transaction costs) and compare it to the ratio of 
the total value of home assets to the value of all assets in the world. We will say that a “home 
bias” exists in country A if the first ratio is larger than the second, that is, if: 
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Whatever the form of the utility function in the first period, the condition for a home bias to 
exist is the same in both countries and is given by: 
0 ) 1 ( ) 1 )( ( ) 1 (
2 2 > − + − + + − δ δ φ B A B A n n n n        (20) 
  The home bias, which we described in section II, arises here if international 
transaction costs exist (φ <1) or if the asset markets are imperfectly competitive (δ>1).  The 
home bias due to international transaction costs is straightforward.  Note  the interaction 























φ , which influences 
                                                           
12 The value of the non-traded portion of wealth (the part of each project kept by the project owner) is given by  
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the level of home bias. Imperfect competition on asset markets also induces a home bias in 
equity holdings because it implies that investors keep a disproportionate amount of their 
projects.  
Financial trade flows: theory and evidence 
  We can easily analyze (in both versions of the model) the determinants of trade flows 
in financial assets. The total value (inclusive of transaction costs) of bilateral asset flows 
(assets of country A bought by agents of country B) is given by the following expression: 
) 1 ( τ + =
A
B A A B A
A
B s z p n n T . Taking the log of this expression and using the equilibrium demand 
for assets (in the general model), we get that financial trade flows from A to B are : 
) / log( log log ) log( ) log( log 1 d
Np
d
c n z p n T
A
B B A A A
A
B
σ β σ φ + + + + =      (21) 
The first term is aggregate financial wealth in country A. The second term is aggregate 
consumption in country B. The third term is a transformation of transaction costs between A 
and B. The fourth term is a function of the expected return of assets in A and the last term is a 
constant. This equation has very strong similarities with a "gravity" equation in trade. Given 
the link between our model and trade theories that have been used  to justify gravity equations 
(see Helpman 1987 for example), this resemblance is not surprising. But there is a major 
difference: for trade in goods, trade costs are mainly seen as transport costs and are usually 
proxied by distance. For trade in assets, trade costs are mainly transaction or information 
costs. 
These results are consistent with the empirical results reported by Portes and Rey 
(1999). These authors do not however test an equation that has the exact form of equation 
(21). We can use the Portes-Rey (1999) data set to do this. The data is a panel of gross 
bilateral portfolio equity flows between 14 developed countries for 8 years (1456 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
the indirect utility function which at the optimum is valued at the market price.  
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observations)
13. The dependent variable is the sales of portfolio equities of country A to 
country B (log). The right hand side variables are 1) McapA: the market capitalization of 
country A (log) (as a proxy for traded and non traded financial wealth), 2) RealConsB: the 
aggregate real consumption of country B (log), 3) TranscostA: proportional transaction costs 
on market A (commissions), and 4) ReturnA: the stock market return for country A (log). 
Given that our model is static and that most of the variation in the data comes from the cross-
sectional dimension, we look at the “between” estimator. The results are very striking (see 
below): all the variables suggested by the theory are significant and appear with the expected 
sign. And with this parsimonious specification, we explain 61% of the cross-sectional 
variance of the data. We also ran a pooled regression including time dummies: the results 
were very similar.  
 
 Coeff.  St.  Error  t  P>|t| 
McapA  1.122 0.128 8.774 0.000 
RealConsB 1.068  0.103  10.409  0.000 
TranscostA  -0.045 0.015 -3.033 0.003 
ReturnA 20.381  2.519  8.091  0.000 
Constant  -21.623 1.682 -13.041 0.000 
 
Notes: 
The dependent variable is the sales of portfolio equities of country A to country B (log). 
Regression on group means: number of groups =  182 
F( 4,  77) =   70.41 




           
VII. Welfare implications 
                                                           
13 See Appendix for more details on the data sources.  
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The market equilibrium is not efficient for two reasons. First, a world planner would 
choose a higher number of projects per person and therefore issue a higher number of assets 
than in the market equilibrium. This sub-optimally high degree of market incompleteness is 
due to the existence of a coordination failure. An agent, when developing a new project, does 
not internalize the benefits that other agents get from the risk-diversification provided. This is 
because in the decentralized equilibrium, the asset price reflects the marginal utility of an 
extra share of a given project but not the marginal utility of opening a new market, which is 
the consequence of the development of a new project
14.  
The other source of inefficiency in the model is the imperfectly competitive structure 
of the asset market, which has two consequences. On the one hand, it leads agents to choose 
to retain too much ownership of the projects they have developed themselves, so that in 
equilibrium there is too little risk diversification. On the other hand, the monopolistic power 
increases the incentives of agents to open risky projects. 
To compare the market and the planner’s equilibrium we choose the symmetric case 
where both countries are identical (nA = nB and yA = yB). This simply allows us to ignore any 
distributional problem but does not change the problem fundamentally. The planner is subject 
to the same technological constraints as the agents in the economy. He maximizes the utility 
of a representative agent in A under the following resource constraint: y = c1A + f(zA).  We 
also assume that the planner is subject to the same transaction costs as in the market 
equilibrium when he redistributes assets across the world. The planner's solution is therefore 
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which we can compare to the market equilibrium in the case of identical countries: 
                                                           
14 For a related study of efficiency in the context of trade models, see for example Matsuyama (1995). 
15 The case of linear utility would give the same qualitative welfare conclusions.  
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A s   s   and  in the 
market equilibrium are smaller than in the planner’s solution. The number of projects per 
agent is also smaller in the market equilibrium than in the planner's solution.  
At first glance, comparing zA in  the planner's and in the decentralized  equilibrium  is 
not obvious. This is because there are two market failures that have contradictory effects on 
the choice of zA in the market equilibrium. On the one hand the coordination failure already 
described means that there are too few projects developed.  On the other hand, because the 
asset market is not perfectly competitive, the price of an asset is above its marginal cost in 
terms of utility. This induces agents to develop more projects. However, it can be shown that 
this second effect is always less important than the coordination failure effect, so that in 
equilibrium too few projects are developed, and too few assets are traded. Hence, the extent 
of financial market incompleteness is too large in the decentralized equilibrium. Note that the 
planner does not in general choose an equilibrium with financial market completeness.  The 
reason is that the planner is subject to the same technological constraints as the agents: it is 
costly (in terms of first period consumption) to develop new projects and assets.  
It is also easy to show that to attain the social optimum in the market equilibrium, a  
subsidy on the demand for traded assets is sufficient. This subsidy must be financed by a 
lump sum tax in the first period. It increases the demand for assets and therefore 
diversification, and also the price level, so that in equilibrium the optimal number of assets is 
developed. The value of this subsidy is simply v = 1/σ, the degree of risk aversion. This is 
quite intuitive as a higher degree of risk aversion induces a greater monopolistic power of 
asset issuers and a higher welfare cost due to an insufficient diversification.    
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VIII. Domestic transaction costs and issuing costs 
So far, we have not introduced domestic transaction costs on asset markets in the main 
analysis. This can be interesting in the context of studying size effects because high domestic 
transaction costs reduce the effective domestic demand for assets and therefore financial 
market size. To analyze this case more clearly, we go back to the illustrative model without 
smoothing effects developed in section IV.  
Suppose now that when agents buy domestic assets, and receive the dividend on those 
assets, they have to bear transaction costs similar in nature to the international transaction 
costs we have analyzed in the previous sections but which are lower than the international 
ones
16. We denote transaction costs of that sort τA and τB respectively on the asset markets of 
country  A and B. In addition, when firms issue shares, they incur costs even before the 
transaction stage.  These issuing costs could be represented, at least partly, as proportional to 
the amount of shares issued: we suppose that these issuing costs are uA and uB per share issued 
and again incurred in units of the share itself.  
The analysis is very similar to the analysis of international transaction costs and 
therefore we do not repeat all the steps for finding the equilibrium. The different demands for 
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The limited diversification result becomes stronger when domestic transaction costs and 
issuing costs are taken into account.  
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  The portions of each project sold on the stock market are now: 
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φ  as in the previous sections, with φ <φA and φB as we assume that 
international transaction costs are higher than domestic ones. 
The prices of assets in the two countries are now: 
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The modified condition on the optimum number of projects per agent is: 
  u p z f     ;     u p z f B B B A A A ) 1 ( ) ( ' ) 1 ( ) ( ' − = − =        (27) 
These results imply that markets with high domestic transaction costs and issuing 
costs are less developed (α is smaller). But the impact on prices is ambiguous:  high domestic 
transaction costs lead to low asset prices, while high issuing costs lead to high asset prices. 
Nevertheless, it can be shown that both high transaction costs and issuing costs induce agents 
to develop less risky projects.  
The intuition can be understood in reference to Graph 3 below. Higher domestic 
transaction costs reduce the domestic demand for assets and shift the demand curve 
downwards. The supply curve is unaffected. In the case of issuing costs, the marginal cost of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
16 This is consistent with the empirical evidence described in Danthine et al. (2000).  
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issuing a share is increased by 1/(1-uA) and 1/(1-uB) respectively, which shifts the supply 
curve to the left.  The demand curve not inclusive of issuing costs is unaffected.  
 










Note that if country A reduces domestic transaction costs, it benefits from three 
effects: 1) a direct positive effect as the cost of diversifying risk is reduced; 2) a financial 
terms of trade improvement as the price of its assets rises relative to the price of foreign assets 
it must buy to diversify risk; 3) a reduction in global risk as markets become less incomplete: 
the increase in asset price induces agents to invest in more risky projects and therefore to 
issue more assets. Hence, welfare unambiguously rises for this country. For country B, the 
welfare effect of lower domestic transaction costs in B is ambiguous: it benefits from global 
risk reduction but suffers a financial terms of trade deterioration, as it must pay a higher price 
to diversify risk when buying assets from A. 
 
IX. Conclusion 
α(1-ui)  i=A,B 
supply (low issuing costs)
supply (high issuing costs) 
demand (high domestic transaction 
costs)
demand (low domestic transaction costs) 
prices  
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This paper has presented a two-country macroeconomic model with an endogenous 
number of financial assets.   This framework can be used to analyze various questions. It links 
the size of economies to the determination of asset returns, the breadth of financial markets 
and the degree of risk sharing. These issues have been largely overlooked by the traditional 
macroeconomic and finance literature. They arise very naturally in our model because we 
have endogenously incomplete asset markets, imperfect substitutability of assets and 
transaction costs. The model is very simple and conveys clear intuitions. It makes sense of 
several empirical findings such as significant demand and market size effects on asset prices 
which have been unexplained so far in a unified model.  
  The theoretical framework developed here can be applied to analyze the impact of 
regional financial integration on welfare and on the geographical location of financial centers 
(see Martin and Rey, 2000). Our model is also a natural framework to analyze the effect of 
regulations that forbid or make it difficult for home agents to buy foreign assets or for foreign 
agents to buy home assets. The first type of regulation is prevalent in industrialized countries 
where pension funds for example cannot easily invest abroad. This could be modeled as an 
imposition of asymmetric transaction costs on the purchase of foreign assets. The impact of 
such policies is quite clear in our framework. As the demand for foreign assets decreases, the 
price of these assets decreases, which induces a favorable financial terms of trade effect for 
the home country. The positive effect of such unilateral policy should however be weighed 
against the increase in global risk it induces: as the price of foreign assets decreases, the 
number of foreign projects/assets decreases, so that financial incompleteness rises.  
It would be interesting to extend the model to include monopolistic competition on the 
goods market. This would allow us to study the interactions between transportation costs on 
the goods market and transaction costs on the asset market
17 and their implications for the 
                                                           
17 For a recent model describing the impact of transport costs on asset holdings see Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001).  
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magnitude of current account deficits and portfolio choice. Our set up provides also a direct 
theoretical link between the extent of industrial specialization and asset market integration. 
Kalemli-Ozcan, Sørensen and Yosha (1999) document empirically that capital market 
integration leads to higher specialization in production through better risk sharing. This 
finding is very much in line with our analysis. 
Finally, our framework is a natural vehicle to analyze in detail the international 
transmission of shocks through the channel of financial markets. We leave these 
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and the symmetric expressions for γB and λB. 
 
Data Sources and definitions
18 
 
Bilateral portfolio equity flows: Cross Border Capital, London 1998. 
The data used are gross cross-border portfolio equity flows. They are principally derived from 
three sources: national balance of payments statistics; official national stock exchange 
transactions; published evidence of international asset switches by major fund 
management groups.  
 
Stock returns, equity market capitalization and real agregate consumption: Datastream. 
 
Transaction costs data: http://www.elkins-mcsherry.com/ 
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